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Making Plans: Representation and IntentionUniversity of Illinois at Chicago, USA Conceiving planning theory as a kind of practical reason shifts attention from making rational arguments justifying planning beliefs to the study of plan-making as a feature of practical reasoning. Adopting this viewpoint allows for the comparison of what rational planning theory keeps apart: theories about plan-making that focus on the representation of urban development (e.g. Lew Hopkins) and theories that study the intentional features of deliberative planning processes (e.g. Judith Innes). Analysis demonstrates that the seemingly incompatible viewpoints can offer complementary insights about plan-making without diminishing or distorting important differences. There need be no epistemic or theoretical gap separating the representation and intention of plan-making; no big difference between substance and process. The differences are practical.
Key Words: adaptability complexity intentionality practical judgment representation
Planning Theory, Vol. 6, No. 1,
16-35 (2007) This article has been cited by other articles:
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